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Giandomenica Becchio 
Two Heterodox Economists: Otto Neurath and Karl Polanyi 
This paper is based on the idea that between the 1920s and the mid-1930s in Vienna there were two 
forms of heterodox economic theory: the Austrian economic school headed by Ludwig von Mises 
and another interesting form of heterodox economics opposed to the Austrian school (above all 
politically) and pursued by various social thinkers (Otto Neurath, Karl Polanyi, Otto Bauer, Felix 
Schaffer, Felix Weil, Jacob Marschak). They were engaged in the debate on the possibilities of a 
planned economy: Austrian socialist economists proposed a sort of ‘third’ way between pure 
capitalism (whose Viennese stronghold was the Austrian economic school) and orthodox 
communism à la Kautzsky (deeply rooted in Germany).  
This paper focuses on the affinities between Neurath and Polanyi’s economic thought: despite some 
major differences between them, they shared a common philosophical background on which they 
founded their heterodox economic theory. After a brief historical premise, there is a first part, 
which deals with the debate on a planned economy and a second part, which deals with the 
influence of Neurath on the Polanyi’s vision of the faults of the neoclassical economic theory: the 
concepts of “disembedded economy” and of the so-called “economicistic fallacy”. 
NEURATH AND POLANYI IN VIENNA  
Neurath described himself as a ‘social engineer’ who wanted to find a technical approach that 
would transform economic systems in order to improve the welfare of individuals, not by changing 
the objective possibilities of increasing the production and the productivity of a country, but by 
finding which institutions and political intervention can redistribute the conditions of possibility of 
happiness for people in that country. He studied economic theory with a view to changing the social 
order on the basis of a rational model for the improvement of the lower classes (Soulez, 1996). As a 
student of Böhm-Bawerk in Vienna and of Gustav Schmoller in Berlin, he was influenced by the 
Austrian school and by the historical school. He adopted a mediate position in the long-standing 
debate on the Methodenstreit, which he considered had been made overcome by a proper definition 
of the scientific status of economics (Leonard 1998). Neurath’s early economic writings dealt with 
economic history and conducted methodological inquiries into ancient and modern economic 
history, and they endeavored to define the ‘economics in kind’ on which Neurath founded his 
model of a planned economy. His article (1919) on a planned war economy provoked a response 
from Ludwig von Mises’ (von Mises 1920; von Hayek 1935) and then a debate between von Mises 
and Polanyi on whether calculation was possible in a socialistic society (Chaloupek 1990; Caldwell 
1997, Neurath 2004, Polanyi, 1987; Uebel 1991). During the 1920s, Neurath explained how 
concepts such as ‘economy-in-kind’ and ‘administrative economy’ were compatible for example 
with Marx’s central ideas and he was busy suggesting concrete models of socialized economic 
systems. In the meantime he joined Schlick’s circle (the Wiener Kreis, i.e. philosophical circle 
founded in 1922 by Moritz Schlick, whose meetings took place every Thursday evening (Feigl   2
1943, 1968, Menger 1994, Joergensen, 1951)) and became one of its most representative members: 
he introduced economics and social science among the disciplines to be treated by the new 
empiricism (the philosophical outlook of the Kreis). During the 1930s his efforts were concentrated 
on the ideal of formulating a unified science and defining so-called ‘physicalism’ applied to social 
science (Neurath 1973; 1983; 2004 and Uebel 1991).  
Karl Polanyi returned to Vienna (where he was born) after the end of World War I in order to study 
economics. Polanyi’s Viennese period was fundamental for development of his subsequent 
economic thought (McRobbie-Polanyi-Levitt, 2000). After 1924, he earned his living as a journalist 
for Der Österreichische Volkswirth, where he was employed as an expert on foreign policy and 
international economic problems, and where he was considered to be “the ‘Red’ among the editors” 
(McRobbie-Polanyi-Levitt 2000, p.310). In 1924 he began holding periodic seminars at his home in 
Vorgartenstrasse 203, and after 1928 he lectured at the Volkshochschule on economic history. 
These meetings were reserved for students and scholars interested in economic theory and the 
methodology of social sciences; among the participants were Karl Popper, Michael Polanyi, Hans 
Zeisel, Paul Lazarfeld, Hugh Gaitskell (who in 1932 spent a year in Vienna as a Rockefeller 
fellow), and Ludwig Wagner. In a letter to Ilona Duczynka (Karl Polanyi’s wife), Felix Schaffer 
recalled these seminars and mentioned Karl Popper, Hans Zeisel, Paul Lazarfeld and Hugh 
Gaitskell as “visitors of this salon” (McRobbie, Polanyi-Levitt, 2000). Students and scholars often 
attended various circles and private seminars (for example Karl Polanyi and Richard Strigl were 
members of the Ernst Mach Society, the official association for the development and the diffusion 
of the activities of the Wiener Kreis (Stadler 2001). According to Schaffer, “Polanyi’s later work 
was an organic development of his earlier work in Vienna” (Schaffer 2000, p. 328). In those years, 
Polanyi’s main concern was “to construct an economic model of a socialistic economy on two 
tracks: a price-forming exchange economy and an administered “purchasing power economy”. This 
polarity gave rise to his subsequent distinction between formalism and substantivism in economics 
and his “thesis of the ‘double-movement’ of the self-protection of society from the disintegrating 
effects of a ‘self-regulating’ market economy”. For Polanyi, economic theory was, at least in his 
Viennese period, “a tool which could show how a socialist economy could function within a price 
system” (ibid p. 332). As Polanyi himself wrote in a private letter: “during these years my ideas on 
social issues have found passionate expression.  The social sciences, activity, but above all the 
possibility of freedom of thought on social issue”. (ibid, p. 317)  The dichotomy between an 
embedded economy and a disembedded one; the two different meanings of ‘economics’ –formalist 
and substantivist; the so-called ‘fictitious commodities’; his interpretation of the market from a 
historical point of view: all these theories were formulated in Vienna, where his job and studies 
enabled him to witness the great turning point in Western society after World War I – the profound 
change that some years later he would call the great transformation.  
PART I: THE DEBATE ON THE PLANNED ECONOMY   3
The debate on the planned economy started after the publication of Neurath’s article appeared in 
1919 (Chaloupek, 1990; Caldwell, 1997; Boettke, 2001); Mises’ direct reply to Neurath followed in 
1920 (Mises 1920, [1935]); Polanyi’s reply to Mises was published in 1922; Mises’ to Polanyi in 
1923; Polanyi’s to Mises in 1924 and finally Neurath’s reply to Mises appeared in 1925.  
         I. 1 Neurath (1919; 1920) 
Neurath’s model of the planned economy (he called “administrative economy”) was based on the 
concepts of “calculation in-kind” (“Naturalrechnung”) and of “economy in kind” 
(“Naturalwirtschaft”). Neurath distinguished the calculation in-kind as a scientific method of 
research in economics from the economy in kind as a particular form of economic organization, a 
moneyless economy. Production and consumption would be planned in kind, but he did not explain 
how the plan should be designed (Chaloupek 1990). Neurath used a “weak” in kind calculation 
(when resources are allocated to the provision of public goods by the state budget and planning is 
done in non-monetary terms) and a “strong” one (when alternative uses of production goods can be 
assessed by quantitative in-kind labour and production technology statistics, without using money) 
(Uebel 2004
1). Economy in kind featured in two distinct ways in Neurath’s work: in the ancient 
world there were different kinds of non-monetary economies; but in the socialistic debate on 
planning Neurath introduced new forms of in-kind economic associations in which monetary units 
disappeared (O’Neill 2004). The final aim of Neurath was to reach the so-called “total 
socialization” (“Vollsozialisierung”) in an administrative economy: it requires a comprehensive 
statistical apparatus on which the plan must be based using a moneyless calculation. In this sense he 
was in opposition to the other German and Austrian social-democratic thinkers
2, such as Bauer or 
Kautsky. According to Bauer a total socialization can be possible only after a slow process of 
development and transformation of capitalistic economy; according to Kautsky, planning cannot be 
the starting point of socialization, but only its final results when capitalistic society is become 
mature enough.  
Neurath argued that in times of peace, profit-oriented economic production provoked cyclical 
periods of overproduction and unemployment. In wartime, by contrast, production was not geared 
to profit and was always fully utilized, while suppression of the price system (replaced by planned 
prices) brought greater stability. In a planned economy, in fact, general needs – and not profit-
seeking – could objectively determine production and ensure a better allocation of means. 
Moreover, there was no need in a planned economy for economic computation in traditional form, 
because any computation of inputs and outputs could be conducted in physical not monetary terms. 
As war economy had shown the urgency of the substitution of free market economy with a planned 
one, Neurath stressed that not every planned economy had necessarily to be socialist
3 and defined it 
                                                 
1 Uebel claimed that Neurath changed back and forth between these two concepts. 
2 The debate on total or partial socialization was the internal querelle in the socialistic movement 
(Chaloupek 1990). 
3 Neurath cited the example of Sparta.   4
as a ‘administrative economy’, i.e. a form of economic organization in a democratic political 
framework. He wrote: “administrative economy and ‘state socialism’ do not mean the same. We 
call socialist one who stands for an administrative economy with socialist distribution” (Neurath 
1973, p. 136) and “a democratic and socialist administration of the economy as a whole may also 
bring with it a far-reaching democratization of firms” (Neurath 1973, p. 139). He imagined a 
productive system ruled by a sort of ‘workers’ council system’ which performed a political role and 
whose function was to provide guidance for firms. A special office - called the Central Economic 
Office – “which would look on the total national economy as a single giant concern”, would be 
responsible for drawing up the national economic plan. It would fix money prices jointly with 
workers’ associations, which were political institutions. In such a ‘large-scale economy in kind’, 
money would lose the power that it had had when prices were formed by free-market competition. 
In A System of Socialization written in 1920/21, (Neurath 2004b), he again reflected on a planned 
economy, writing that the Russian revolution had lacked a project for the future: it was the 
expression of the “bitterness and longing” of the proletariat. Neurath was convinced that there was 
an urgent need for a planned administrative economy and for calculation in kind, and he envisaged 
a “global socialization” – which would begin in Germany – configured as a socialistic central order 
with cooperatives of craftsmen and peasants. He firmly believed that a system of this kind would 
“pave the way to a future economic tolerance” in a non-capitalist society. Neurath started from a 
definition of the quality of life (happiness and misery of human beings) as depending upon the 
conditions of life (housing, food, clothing, education, entertainment, work, and so on) determined, 
from a social point of view, by an order of life (institutions and types of behaviour)
4. An order of 
life organized on a socialist basis was called socialization. A process of socialization would replace: 
the free market (a) with the administrative economy (a1); rule by the masters (b) with rule by the 
community (b1);  economy of masters (c) with a collective economy (c1); and the under-use of 
resources (d) with the full use of resources (d1). Keeping in mind Tönnies’ well-known dichotomy, 
Neurath claimed that this socialization process could be realised either in a order of society (e), that 
worked through payment according to performance, contracts etc., or in an order of community (e1) 
that adapted performance to the abilities and consumption to the demand formed through custom. 
Socialization could be based either on the principle of society (f) or on the principle of community 
(f1) and it could use existing institutions, after their further development (g), or new institutions 
after elimination (g1) of the “old-fashioned” ones. Finally, this socialization could be performed 
peaceably (h) or by force (h1)
5. The aim of socialization was to achieve not only economic 
                                                 
4 Economic theory analyses historical economic orders, and when it concerns itself with how “economic 
orders may be put into practice”, it becomes “part of social engineering”. 
5 Neurath maintained that there were 256 possible combinations among these various elements. The 
economic organization was a form of planned collectivism in which the full use of resources could be 
achieved. At this point the choice was between a societal principle or a communitarian one. If the societal 
order adopted a societal principle, society achieved socialism (a1, b1, c1, d1, e, f); if it adopted a 
communitarian principle, it achieved guild-socialism – defined as ‘solidarism’–  (a1, b1, c1, d1, e, f1). If the 
communitarian principle gave rise to a communitarian organization, society achieved communism (a1, b1,   5
efficiency but also equal  distribution.  It is important to underline that Neurath distinguished 
between two concepts of efficiency: the concept of “rentabilität” valid only within a market 
economy, and the concept of “Wirtschaftlichkeit”, valid in the framework of “Naturalrechnung”. As 
we will see, economic efficiency and equal distribution will be regarded as the final aims of 
socialization also in Polanyi’s later model. 
         I.2 Mises (1920) versus Neurath (1919) 
In his reaction to Neurath, Mises ([1920] 1935) claimed that a moneyless economy and a planned 
economy were impossible from a theoretical point of view. He argued that: “money is a universal 
medium of exchange” (Mises 1935, p. 92) even in a socialist state where all the means of 
production were the property of the community, and where the political authority “can dispose of 
them and determines their use in production” (Mises 1935, p. 89). Monetary calculation was 
possible when all available productive resources were defined by a system of scarcity indexes given 
by a system of prices: any price (which can be converted into an index of relative scarcity) can only 
expressed in monetary form. Moreover, these indexes could be formed if any resource was 
allocated in a free market. In a society where the means of production were state-controlled, “no 
production-good will ever become the object of exchange [and then] it will be impossible to 
determine its monetary value” (Mises 1935, p. 92). In a socialist state, money would lose its ‘role’ 
of determining the value of production-goods, so that calculation becomes impossible. The 
substitution of monetary calculation with ‘calculation in natura’ (Neurath’s economy in kind) was 
useless – according to Mises – because “in an economy without exchange, [it] can embrace 
consumption-goods only” but it fails to determine production-goods, and so “rational production 
becomes completely impossible” (Mises 1935, p. 104). It is for this reason that in a socialistic 
society supply “proceed[s] anarchically” and there is conspicuous waste: “there will be hundreds 
and thousands of factories in operation. Very few of these will be producing wares ready for use; in 
the majority of cases what will be manufactured will be unfinished goods and production-goods” 
(Mises 1935, p. 106). On the contrary, Mises claimed that the system of computation by value in an 
economic system of private ownership of the means of production eliminated waste, because 
everybody was at the same time consumer and producer. According to Mises, Neurath was wrong 
when: “he advanced the view that every complete administrative economy is, in the final analysis, a 
natural economy” (Mises 1935, p. 107); just a static state could probably be regulated by a natural 
calculation without using money, but such a state was “only conceptually possible”; only in a free 
market is there a pricing mechanism for a possible calculation
6.  
            I.3 Polanyi (1922) versus Mises (1920) 
                                                                                                                                                                  
c1, d1, e1, f1) (Neurath 2004, p. 351). Socialism and communism shared the aim of eliminating ownership 
of the means of production (g1) through violent revolution (h1), contrary to guildism, which preferred the 
peaceful evolution (g) of the old institutions (h). 
6 In the 1930s, Hayek modified Mises’ objections by admitting to the possibility that a price mechanism 
could be created without a market, but he maintained that such a calculation was too complex, and once 
the final result was obtained, the initial conditions had certainly changed. (Hayek, 1935).   6
Neurath’s direct answer to Mises’s criticisms appeared only in 1925 (Neurath 2004). In the 
meantime, Karl Polanyi’s two papers on socialist computation (Polanyi 1922; 1924) were 
published. They were explicit replies to Mises’s objections (1920) against Neurath (1919; 1920) 
and to himself (Mises, 1923). These two articles were cited in the bibliography to the well-known 
Collectivistic Economic Planning edited by F. von Hayek in 1935, in which von Mises’ articles of 
the 1920s were translated in English. Polanyi’s first paper (1922) dealt with the possibility of a 
planned economy in a so-called functionalist  society, i.e a society organized according to the 
principles of English guildism, a kind of socialism in which the function of the trade unions should 
not to be restricted to wage bargaining, but they should organize production after all the means of 
production have been transferred to the state. Polanyi was highly critical of the “moneyless 
command economy of Neurath”, in which “producers and consumers were not represented in two 
independent associations [and] decisions on production and consumption were taken by a central 
authority” (Schaffer 2000, p. 329). Against Neurath and in agreement with Mises, Polanyi rejected 
the theory of an in-kind economy, or an economy without money, arguing that solution to the 
problem of socialist computation in an administrative economy was impossible. Polanyi called 
“dogmatic” both liberal economists and the proponents of an economy without exchange, such as 
“Kautsky-Neurath-Trockij” (Polanyi 1922). Polanyi was wrong, however, to consider Kautsky as 
taking up a position close to Neurath’s. Kautsky, in fact, was strongly opposed to the idea of a 
moneyless economy (Kautsky, 1921). According to Polanyi, the main fault in the theory was that 
“it is impossible to separate the natural economic cost from the social cost deriving from citizen 
rights” (Schaffer 2000, p.329). Polanyi argued contrary to Mises that achieving efficiency in 
production and equality in distribution was only possible in a socialist society. For Polanyi the 
contrast between socialism and capitalism could no longer reduced to that between an economy 
without exchange and an economy of exchange; because capitalism was very far from having 
created a free market, and an economy on a large scale was impossible without a mechanism of 
exchange. Polanyi then proposed a solution not feasible for all systems of socialism but only for 
“functionalistic” ones, such as guild socialism based on a sort of market-socialism model where the 
economy was planned, but not centrally. Polanyi was convinced that there was no ‘socialist positive 
theory’ because from a scientific point of view the only theoretical doctrine of economics was the 
marginalist one. This lack of a positive theory of socialistic economics made it difficult to find a 
solution to the problem of socialist computation. Polanyi defined as ‘socialist’ every economy 
whose aim is the realization of two exigencies: the maxim productivity in the sphere of production
7 
and social rights in the sphere of the distribution
8; in such an economy the problem of calculation 
became: how can a model able to express in numbers the relation between maxim production and 
                                                 
7 According to Polanyi the word “productivity” has two meanings: a technical one (the maximum quantity 
of output using the minimum amount of labour, i.e. u/l) and a social one (the maxim public utility of 
goods). 
8 By ‘social rights’ Polanyi meant “a principle that leads production in an useful sense for the whole 
society and an equal distribution of goods”.   7
social rights be reached. In a capitalist society productivity fall short of the maximum achievable 
level (cyclical crises halt production, and monopolies slow it down) and the importance of public 
goods is not completely realized. By contrast, a socialistic economy is able to guarantee maximum 
productivity and equal distribution through the correct computation of costs
9. The computation can 
be performed neither by an administrative economy (Neurath’s model), because prices must be 
expressed in monetary form nor by a liberal system (Mises’s one), where prices are formed in an 
unregulated free market where waste and underutilization of resources are frequent. Costs can be 
correctly computed jointly by the local political authority (the Kommune) and the productive 
associations. The Kommune owns the means of production; while productive associations have the 
right to use them. Local productive associations form the regional associations which constitute the 
central congress for the entire productive system; besides these productive associations there were 
the associations of consumers represented by the Kommune and by some cooperatives. Political 
authority, associations of consumers and producers jointly determined prices and quantities:   
Polanyi’s model of a planned society was very similar to Neurath’s one. 
I.4  Mises (1923) versus Polanyi (1922) and Polanyi’s answer (1924) 
Mises replied to Polanyi’s article (Mises, 1923) claiming that any third form of society between 
socialism and liberalism could not exist and that the presence of the productive associations was 
merely an escamotage: in fact, from a political point of view, when the final decision was taken by 
the Kommune, the form of society was that of an administrative economy – for which not even 
Polanyi admitted a form of computation; when the final decision was taken by the congress of 
productive associations, then this was a form of syndicalism.  Polanyi claimed that Mises’ mistake 
was to believe that only one political group took final decisions: at least two legislative groups 
usually took them, in fact. Mises added that the contraposition between consumers and producers 
still persisted in a functional society, while in a capitalist society it could be overcome because  
each single agent was a producer and a consumer at the same time. Polanyi answered that as the 
single individual stays in equilibrium, so functional associations manage to reach equilibrium 
(Polanyi, 1924). Polanyi’s second paper on the problem of socialistic computation was not only an 
answer  to von Mises, but to all the liberals and the state socialists (Leichter 1923, Weil 1924) who 
shared the opinion that the contraposition “market economy versus market-less economy” could 
only be another expression for capitalism versus; they even agreed on the fact that the only 
alternative to the capitalist system was collectivist socialism. Against them, Polanyi claimed that 
there were the ‘positive’ socialists (Polanyi himself, English guildists like Cole, and ‘scientific 
socialists’ like Heimann and Marschak), who sought to develop a positive theory of socialism able 
to overcome “the scholastic dispute between orthodox Marxists and their bourgeois enemies”, 
because only a ‘positive’ socialist theory could fulfil the double exigency of maximizing production 
and guaranteeing social rights.  
                                                 
9 These costs are natural and social: natural costs are those of material production; social costs are those 
able to guarantee a proper and equal distribution.    8
I.5 Neurath (1925) versus Mises (1922)  
Neurath’s direct reference to Mises’ criticism was in Wirtschaftsplan und Naturalrechnung, 
(Neurath, 2004c [1925]): Mises had claimed that money calculation is the only basis of production. 
Despite of this fact, talking about monopolized commodities (whose surplus is bound to be lock up 
or destroyed), he also affirmed a separate concept of wealth in respect of money calculation. Mises 
considered socialist economy as a “gigantic monopoly economy” and was firmly in the conviction 
that “without calculation with one unit, an economy is not possible”, as socialism “does not 
acknowledge calculation with one unit”, it is impossible. On the contrary, according to Neurath, 
“calculation in kind in the economic plan must be the moneyless basis of the socialist  calculation 
of economic efficiency” (Neurath, 2004c, p. 430). Neurath specified the nature of an economic 
plan, that has a double role: it is a ‘plan of production’ (in the sense that “it gave information about 
the way in which resources of raw materials, land work power are to be combined to get a definite 
result in the conditions of life”), but it is also a ‘plan of consumption’ (“as it shares out parts of the 
conditions of life after it has been decided what is to be kept in store”) (Neurath, 2004c, p. 425). 
Neurath regarded the socialist administrative economy as an alternative to the free trade economy, 
above all because the former is not based –as the later is – on “commodity” and it did not consider 
money as a commodity. This critique of money as a commodity as well as the critique of Neurath to 
the concept of ‘automatic’ market, that “as an ‘external’ power determined costs, profits, etc” 
(Neurath, 2004c, p. 431) will be taken later by Polanyi in his formulation of the fallacy of   
“fictitious commodities” (money, labour and land) and of self-regulating market. 
PART II: THE FAULTS OF NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
One of the aims of Neurath’s and Polanyi’s research in economics was to understand the meaning 
of economics itself and to define a proper methodology for its treatment as a science. In 1913 
Neurath defined economics as a science concerned with the material conditions of human life. He 
wrote: “by political economy we shall understand a science that investigates wealth in its 
dependence on human actions or institutions; by wealth we shall understand an amount of pleasure 
and pain in an individual or a group of individuals; this demarcation of wealth approximately 
coincides with the concept of real income or of happiness in its widest sense. In a political economy 
it is possible to disregard all concrete manifestations of pleasure or pain and consider pleasure and 
pain as such; for instance, in trying to establish how the pleasure and pain of a group of individuals 
depends on the different ways of price formation” (Neurath 2004, p. 297). Like Neurath, Polanyi 
was closely influenced by Mach’s epistemology, and he was deeply interested in the 
methodological debate on the social sciences – as testified by many of his unpublished papers. Karl 
Popper wrote in a note to The Open Society that the distinction between methodological 
essentialism and methodological nominalism was explained to him by Polanyi in 1925, during an 
evening meeting at Polanyi’s home: according to Popper, Polanyi suggested that rigorous reform of   9
the social sciences required the complete abandonment of the essentialism on which they were 
founded.
10 
II. 1 The faults: abstractness and fallacy  
In The Conceptual Structure of Economic Theory and its Foundations (1917) - a review of Wilhelm 
Wundt’s  Logik - Neurath analyzed the nature of the social sciences and emphasized the great 
difficulties that arise when one attempts to construct a taxonomy of the sciences: “the so-called 
social sciences are particularly difficult to classify. They have not been demarcated by systematic 
considerations. In Duhem and Poincarè, general considerations are not only exemplified, but the 
origins of the concepts and of the problems are traced right from the initial observation of facts if at 
all possible” (Neurath 2004, p. 269). Duhem and Poincarè emphasized that “the origins of the 
concepts and of the problems” are to be determined “right from the initial observation of facts if at 
all possible” (Neurath 2004, ibid.). This also applied to economic concepts such as ‘capital’, ‘price’, 
‘productivity’, ‘value’, which Neurath considered to be still ambiguously treated in economic 
theory: in fact, they were too often analysed without proceeding “in conjunction with empirical 
research” (ibid). In his review Neurath maintained that the traditional strong opposition between 
“abstract economic theory” and “concrete economics” (ibid. p.271) should be dropped in order to 
define economics as a science, and he set out his two main criticisms of the economics of his time. 
First, economics confused the analysis of human action – according to which human actions and 
patterns of behaviour are not assumed to be consciously goal-directed - with the theory of choice 
motivation. According to Neurath, the motivations of human action were to be treated as a “a 
separate question” (p. 276).  If economic theory became independent from the inquiry into the 
motivations for choice, it could resolve the controversy on the role of history and theory at the 
centre of Methodenstreit, whose echoes were still reverberating at that time. The second fault of 
economics was the “fallacy” of identifying the discipline as a whole with just one historical model 
(the monetary economy), which it “followed too closely”(ibid., p. 278). Economic theory borrowed 
from this model a theoretical and conceptual pattern which it considered to be general but which in 
fact was valid only for that particular historical model: “economic theory also followed too closely 
the example of monetary economics” (p. 278). Neurath wrote that “the thought was lost sight of 
that money itself is but a means of the technique of organization that might be radically changed or 
even removed” (p. 278).  
The first step toward a scientific economics was the elimination of abstract concepts like “homo 
oeconomicus”
11. Neurath stressed that “which human actions condition these changes is a separate 
                                                 
10 Karl Popper The Open Society and its Enemies, London, Routledge & Kegan, 1936. Popper used the 
term ‘methodological essentialism’ for the theoretical method which assumed that the aim of knowledge-
acquisition is the discovery of the real essences of things; and the term ‘methodological nominalism” for 
theoretical method which assumed that the aim of knowledge-acquisition was not to discover what a thing 
is, but how something functions and if there were any regularities in its functiong. In 1922 L. von Mises 
argued that this methodological contrast in the social sciences corresponded to the political one between 
socialist collectivism and individual liberalism.   10
question”. In fact “economic theory can extend its domain only in this way, but not if it already 
prejudges what conditions will prevail”. He reformulated the aim of economics as a science as 
resolving the “question of how one could choose into the combination, given certain conditions”, 
adding that such a choice “belongs to a currently expanding area of mathematics” (p. 277). As a 
consequence, economics must investigate the ways in which the “transfers of goods” took place in 
order to determine “the conditions under which one state can be derived from the other” (p. 276).  
Neurath maintained that reconstructing economic science in order to remedy what he called “the 
lack of an adequate set of theoretical concepts” (Neurath 2004, p. 312) – was functional to the 
radical change in the economic system that the war had demonstrated was possible. He was 
convinced that the aim of economic theory was to explain how the material conditions of life are 
formed by “transfers of goods” and to identify the conditions under which one state can be derived 
from the other.
12 According to Neurath, this “lack of an adequate set of theoretical concepts was 
already sensed before the WW, but is felt even more clearly now that the conflict between the 
market economy and administrative economy becomes ever more evident”. Neurath was deeply 
interested in investigating concrete alternatives to liberal society. He maintained that it was 
necessary “to create a structure for an economic theory that is able in principle to provide equal 
theoretical treatment to all possible forms of economic activity.” (ibid p. 312). This is possible only 
using an economy-in-kind, that derived, not from the concept of economic efficiency, but from that 
of “wealth”, i.e. “what one produces and consumes in the widest sense” (p. 340).  This concept “is 
linked to all those scholars who simultaneously treat different forms of economy and to all those 
who as utopians treat of possible institutions” (ibid). Neurath pointed out that only a small number 
of economists had been able to do this, most notably Carl Menger and Vilfredo Pareto. He defined 
‘economic theory’ as: “the scientific treatment of economies, that is, of orders of life as the 
conditions of qualities of life”, and he defined “economy” as “the sum total of actions, measures, 
behaviours, etc, which can be considered as conditions for smaller and greater economic efficiency” 
(p. 318). He argued that different forms of economy had followed each other, and correct 
comparison among them (“comparative economic theory”) was necessary in order to understand 
which of them could guarantee the best qualities of life.  
Polanyi entirely agreed with Neurath’s two criticisms of economic theory at the time – abstractness 
and fallacy – as is evident when reading his masterwork, The Great Transformation (1944), an 
inquiry into the political and economic origins of Western civilization. The historical thesis with 
which Polanyi began The Great Transformation was that “nineteenth century civilization has 
                                                                                                                                                                  
11 According to Nemeth 1996, Neurath criticized the concept of homo oeconomicus  and he considered the 
economy in kind as an approach under which the effects of the existing money economy order could be 
compared with others.  
12 According to Amann (1996), on formulating the notion of ‘life conditions’ Neurath had two goals in 
mind: to give a socio-theoretical explanation for the total life context and to model society in keeping with 
social planning.   11
collapsed” (Polanyi 1960, p.3) after the fall of the four institutions on which it was based.
13 The 
First World War caused their collapse, and the consequences were the economic crisis of the 1920s, 
the rise of totalitarianism, and the Second World War. Polanyi’s main thesis was that the First 
World War had resulted from a mechanism whereby society protected itself when it had realized 
the fallacy of the market society, which transformed man and nature in commodities and divided 
society into two autonomous spheres, political and economic, which formerly had been united.  
According to Polanyi, in every former economic system there had been markets in which goods 
were exchanged, but during the nineteenth century isolated and regulated markets had been 
transformed into an artificial self-regulating market “naively imagined as the natural outcome of the 
spreading of markets” but which on the contrary was “the effect of highly artificial” transformation 
(p. 37). He defined the market economy as “an economic system controlled, regulated and directed 
by markets alone; order in production and distribution of goods is entrusted to this self-regulating 
mechanism” (p.68) In a society of this kind “there are markets for all elements of industry, not only 
for goods (always including services) but also for labour, land and money, their prices being called 
respectively commodity price, wages, rest and interest” (p. 69). This was the so-called mercification 
of fictitious commodities, and this artificial transformation had given rise to a separation between 
an economic and political sphere in society: “normally, the economic order is merely a function of 
the social, in which it is contained. Neither under tribal, nor feudal, nor mercantile conditions was 
there a separate economic system in society” (p.71). The most dangerous consequence of this 
artificial fallacy-based dichotomy was that “labor and land are no other than the human beings 
themselves of which every society consists and the natural surroundings in which it exists. To 
include them in the market mechanism means to subordinate the substance of society itself to the 
laws of the market” (ibid).  
According to Polanyi, during the nineteenth century “the dynamics of modern society was governed 
by a double movement: the market expanded continuously but this movement was met by a 
countermovement checking the expansion in definite directions” (p. 130). This ‘countermovement’ 
was the means by which society protected itself, and the ‘double movement’ was that of two 
organizing principles in society: “the one was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the 
establishment of a self-regulating market, relying on the support of the trading classes, and using 
largely laissez-faire and free trade as its method; the other was the principle of social protection 
aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization, relying on the 
varying support of those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market – 
primarily, but not exclusively, the working and the landed classes – and using protective legislation, 
                                                 
13 They were: the balance of power among the European states; the gold standard; the idea of a self-
regulating market; and political liberalism. Polanyi wrote: “the fount and matrix of the system was the 
self-regulating market. It was this innovation that gave rise to a specific civilization. The gold standard 
was merely an attempt to extend the domestic market system to the international field; the balance-of-
power system was a superstructure erected upon and, partly, worked through the gold standard; the liberal 
state was itself a creation of the self-regulating market” (ibid).    12
restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention as its methods” (p. 132). This 
countermovement was a spontaneous reaction against economic liberalism and it sprang from the 
social tensions generated by two centuries of the liberal system. The Great Crisis was the final 
breakdown of this old system: it demonstrated that a self-regulating market was a dangerous utopia, 
an artificial creation that seemed to be natural.  
II.2 Neurath’s solution: economics as a part of sociology in the unified science  
The Manifesto (1929) treated economics, together with history, as a social science and placed it 
among the group of five sciences (arithmetic, physics, geometry, biology and psychology, and the 
social sciences) that were to become the subject-matter of the new positivist philosophy after the 
“elimination of metaphysical admixtures” still present in them. Neurath defined the scientific 
features of ‘history’ and ‘political economy’ in his Empirical Sociology (1931), where he 
maintained that “they set closer together and merged into a single science”, namely ‘sociology’. 
Neurath thus bridged the gap between history and economic theory about which he had written 
many years before, claiming that Marxism had demonstrated that the separation between economics 
and history no longer made sense, “especially in Western Europe” (Neurath 1973, p. 346). In this 
paper he described the passage from a magical phase of science to the so-called ‘unified science’, 
Einheitswissenshaft, on which Neurath had worked throughout the 1930s. This ideal of an unified 
science could be achieved by transferring the language of physics to the other sciences using a neo-
empiricist approach: Neurath termed this new scientific language “physicalism”. In Physicalism 
(1931), he explained that: “at first the Vienna Circle analysed ‘physics’ in a narrower sense almost 
exclusively; now psychology, biology, sociology. The task of this movement is unified science and 
nothing less” (Neurath 1983, p. 52). The classification of known objects now comprised concepts of 
the mind’s experiences and qualities, physical objects, and the objects of the social sciences. All of 
these were to be included in the so-called unified science because they had constant and 
quantitative relations to which physicalism was applicable.  
The project to unify sciences was accomplished in the Encyclopaedia of Unified Sciences, which 
was presented at international congresses for the unity of science between 1934 and 1939 (Stadler, 
2001). At the Paris congress of 1935, Robert Gibrat (1936) described economics as a complex 
science that must be expressed in mathematical terms, and in particular by econometric tools able to 
analyze statistical data (see Becchio-Marchionatti 2005). The importance of statistics for economic 
analysis was a constant of Neurath’s thought: for him, statistics was the sole tool required by  
calculation in kind (Neurath 2004, p. 327).  .  
In Neurath’s main contribution to the Encyclopaedia, “On foundations of social sciences” ([1944] 
1969), he explained how economics had become a science and again proposed a form of economics 
in kind: “we should treat this whole field of money reckoning anthropologically as a piece of 
modern ethnology. And from the point of view of social engineering, we might also analyze other 
institutions comparatively, various money organizations, and – that is important – organizations   13
which are not based on money and nevertheless cover all kinds of modern technology and 
communication. … The question is not whether the future society will be based on money, but 
whether their analysis is scientifically performed in comparing all kinds of societies … We may ask 
how we can compare the results of a society based on money reckoning with a society based on 
reckoning in kind (“economy in money” compared with “economy in kind”), i.e., how we can look 
at their efficiency in terms of living conditions. It may be that the result of such an analysis of a 
world society, based on reckoning in kind and not in money, would be less efficient in terms of 
living conditions. The money taboo is so general that even in the Soviet Union the study of money-
free societies has been abandoned as a kind of  left deviation” (p.13).  
In his last paper, published posthumously in 1946 (Neurath 2004), Neurath recalled that many 
Austrian scholars had continued to work during the difficult years of the Second World War, and he 
maintained that his “Foundation of social sciences” was an example of the application of ‘Logical 
Empiricism’ not only to scientific issues but also to everyday problems. Neurath remembered that 
he had started to study Mach, Avenarius, Duhem and Poincaré “mainly from a scientific point of 
view, feeling that the traditional self-confidence of ‘scientific absolutism’ did not harmonise with 
the ‘relativism of scientific practice’”, but he affirmed that “acknowledging a kind of primary 
‘pluralism’ in our scientific approach has also its consequences for our daily life”. Because daily 
life is full of decisions, Neurath’s aim was to determine whether and how it was possible to make 
predictions concerning either scientific research or daily life. Although he claimed that 
“unpredictability” was “an essential element of empiricism” and repudiated the use of “historical 
predictions as the basis of social actions”, he was convinced that is was necessary to construct “a 
scientific language which serves all our scientific activities” (p. 553). This he called “terminological 
empiricism” as an approachable to develop a ‘universal jargon’ useful for scientific cooperation and 
for eliminating all the ‘metaphysical speculations’ which divide human beings. According to 
Neurath the pluralistic approach of Logical Empiricism prevented the creation of “the rule of one 
and only one ‘ideal’” and consequently the rise of “any kind of totalitarian outlook” (p. 554).  
II.3 Polanyi’s solution: the substantivist meaning of economics  
On the basis of Robbins’ definition of economic choice as the logic of rational action grounded on 
two assumptions – the existence of means and ends, and the norm according to which ‘means shall 
be allocated to ends’ – Polanyi (1941) argued that a situation in which there are scales of 
preferences and a scarce amount of goods of definite utility was an economic situation in the 
‘formal’ sense. In such a system equilibrium could be reached either in a liberal system (in which 
“the scales of preference may be given by the needs and wants of an individual – Robinson) or in a 
collectivist society (in which those scales of preference are determined by the Supreme Economic 
Council).  On this definition of formal economics, Polanyi sought to show that the formal meaning 
of ‘economic’ is not the unique one (Polanyi 1953). According to Polanyi, ‘economic’ has two 
meanings: a formal one that derives from the logical character of the means-end relationship; and a   14
substantive one that derives from man’s dependence for his livelihood upon nature, and that does 
not involve the necessity of a choice induced by the limiting effect of the scarcity of means. 
Substantivist economics is: “embedded and enmeshed on a variety of institutions, man’s livelihood 
is the subject matter of the other social sciences as well, such as sociology, anthropology and, of 
course, economic history” (ibid. p.1).  
Polanyi explicitly asserted the supremacy of the substantive meaning over the formal one: “only the 
substantive meaning of economic can yield the basic concepts that are required by the social 
sciences for an investigation of the empirical economies of the past and the present” (p. 2) The 
formal meaning was in fact historically determined by the special organization of man’s livelihood 
that had taken shape in Western Europe and North America over the past two centuries, and it 
“consisted in a system of price-making markets [in which] the rules of choice happened to be 
singularly applicable” (ibid). The artificial identification of the economy with its market form had 
given rise to the so-called ‘economistic fallacy’: “from Hume and Spencer to Frank H: Knight and 
Northrop, social thought suffered from this limitation wherever it touched on the economy. Lionel 
Robbins’ essay (1932), though useful to economists, fatefully distorted the problem” (ibid).  
According to Polanyi, Menger alone – in his posthumous edition of Grunsätze – had been aware of 
these two meanings of ‘economic’, but “neither he nor Max Weber, not Talcott Parsons after him 
apprehended the significance of the distinction for sociological analysis” (ibid). Polanyi ([1958] 
1971) underlined that Menger produced the second edition of his Grundsätze in order to restrict 
application of the formal meaning of ‘economic’ to the ‘the modern exchange economy’ 
(Verkehrswirshaft) founded on exchange”. In chapter IV of Grundsätze (1923) he writes: “the   
economy has two ‘elemental directions’, one of which was the economizing direction stemming 
from the insufficiency of means, while the other was the ‘techno-economic’ direction, as he called 
it, derived from the physical requirements of production regardless of the sufficiency or 
insufficiency of means” (p.22). The former kind of economics, called maximizing or economical 
(okonomisierende),  is founded on the postulate of scarcity. The latter, called techno-economical 
(sparend, or wirtshaftend), is founded on the physical character of production, free from any link 
with scarcity of means. After the marginalist revolution, economic theory had used the principle of 
scarcity as its only paradigm, achieving such outstanding results that the substantivist meaning of 
economics had been abandoned. Knight translated the German word wirtschaften, (the substantivist 
meaning) with the English word economizing, which Menger restricted to the formal meaning of 
“economic”. According to Hayek (1934), Menger’s second edition “remains in the form of 
voluminous but fragmentary and disordered manuscripts, which only the prolonged and patient 
efforts of a very skilful editor could make accessible. For the present, at any rate, the results of the 
work of Menger’s later years must be regarded as lost” (Hayek 1934, p. 416). Frank Knight, editor 
of the first English translation of Grundsätze in 1950, agreed with Hayek. According to Polanyi, 
after the rise of the marginalist doctrine and “because of the brilliant and formidable achievements   15
of price theory opened up by Menger, the new economizing or formal meaning of economic became 
the meaning” (p. 24), while the “meaning of materiality, which was not necessarily scarcity-bound, 
lost academic status and was eventually forgotten” (ibid).  
Substantive economics enables construction of a model of the economy “as an instituted process of 
interaction serving the satisfaction of material wants” (p. 31), - i.e a process that “provide material 
means in society” (p. 34); it should be understood as consisting of two levels: “the interaction 
between man and his surroundings and the institutionalisation of that process” (ibid). ‘Interaction’ 
is undertaken in order to achieve material result in terms of survival by local movements 
(production, transportation, transaction and dispositions of things) and appropriation movements 
(“the legal acquisition of property” of material or non-material objects, “administration and 
circulation of goods, distribution of income, tribute and taxation”). ‘Institutionalisation’ is 
undertaken in order to find the form of integration between man and nature that involves “the 
relations of the economic process to the political and cultural spheres of the society at large” (p. 
35). Three forms of integration could embed economy in a society as a whole: reciprocity, 
redistribution and exchange. These could be represented “as diagrams of the patterns made by the 
movements of goods and person in the economy, whether these movements consist of changes in 
their location, in their appropriation, or both” (ibid). Reciprocity is a form of integration in which 
goods and persons move “between corresponding points of symmetrical arrangement”; 
redistribution is a form of integration in which goods are moved from and to a central point; 
exchange is a form of integration in which the movement is between two random points of the 
system. These three forms had usually co-existed in ancient and modern societies, until the advent 
of the economic system of the nineteenth century. Before the rise of market-society and thanks to 
these three kinds of integration, the economic sphere had been embedded in society; the rise of 
market-society had led economy outside the rest of society: it became autonomous, disembedded, 
with its own laws and rules, and based solely on the supply-demand price mechanism.  
The mistakes on which the capitalist economy was based are explained in The Livelihood of Man 
(Polanyi 1977). These errors were: the economistic fallacy (a logical mistake according to which 
human economy in general is identical with one of its particular forms – the market form based on 
the supply-demand-price mechanism); economistic transformation (of isolated markets into a self-
regulating system of markets, which was the “crucial step” for transformation of labour and land 
into fictitious commodities); economic rationalism (the logical and mental procedures of the human 
beings that lived and worked in a market society); and economic solipsism (the distance between 
the economic field and the political one). Finally, Polanyi claimed that when economics became a 
science, “economists felt so safe within the confines of such a purely theoretical market system that 
they only grudgingly conceded to nations more than a nuisance value” (Polanyi 1968p. 15).   
Polanyi’s last efforts were devoted to investigating substantivist anthropology, as a method which   16
applied his categories to ancient and pre-capitalistic society in order to demonstrate the validity of 
his thesis of a fallacy in the liberal system. 
CONCLUSIONS 
After this reconstruction of Neurath’s and Polanyi’s economic thought, it is possible to affirm that 
Neurath exerted a powerful influence on Polanyi, although there were some important differences 
between their theories. They were both involved in the debate on economic planning against liberal 
economists, and they engaged in profound inquiry into the methodology of the social sciences and 
of economics; they were convinced that it was necessary to go beyond the old Methodenstreit and 
mediate the position of those who adopted the opposite view of economics. Neurath’s concept of 
‘administrative economy’ (a centralized economical organization in a democratic system) was 
fundamental for Polanyi’s subsequent notion of an ‘embedded economy’ (a kind of economic 
system dependent on the political one). Neurath’s ‘economy in-kind’, founded on the notion of 
‘wealth’ as “what one produces and consumes in the widest sense” (Neurath 2004, p. 340), 
influenced Polanyi’s substantivist economy founded on the notion of man’s dependence for his 
livelihood upon nature.  
Although Polanyi openly criticized Neurath’s idea of an economy without money (this being the 
greatest difference between them), they agreed that it was necessary to construct a new society in 
which the economy was embodied (or ‘embedded’): they believed that a socialist economy was the 
only form of organized society able to guarantee political freedom, economic efficiency and equal 
distribution, and they were sceptical that such aims could be achieved in a soviet model of society 
(they were both contrary to Marxism). According to Neurath, money had lost its characteristic 
function in this new form of society, which was why he sought to analyze economics from an in-
kind (or moneyless) perspective, rather than from that of price formation under the liberal market 
model. The development of this method and system of organization was useful not only for socialist 
society but also for any democratic society standing as an alternative to the liberal one. Neurath’s 
idea that “whereas in the free market economy a price was determined automatically and not 
evaluated from a social perspective, a price set by associations under the control of the state is a 
direct result of power relations and will be perceived as an achievement of the society as a whole” 
(Neurath 2004 p. 255) was expressed in the same terms by Polanyi.  
According to Polanyi and Neurath, the ‘formalistic economy’, on which capitalism is based was an 
error from a psychological point of view, and it was useless from a sociological one.  It should be 
replaced either by a form of economy based on the fact that man is obliged to interact with nature in 
order to earn his livelihood (Polanyi’s substantivism) or by a functional economy based on 
“comprehensive social analysis into the standard of living in order to arrive at a general theory of 
society” (Neurath 2004, p. 524). Neurath and Polanyi were convinced that the economic process is 
based on the relation between man and nature, that human behavior is framed by an institutional 
system, and that society had lapsed into the so-called ‘natural fallacy’ (as Whitehead termed it): it   17
was theoretically identified with only one of its historical forms, namely the monetary one. 
Neurath’s formulation of a ‘naturalistic fallacy’ according to which the general meaning of political 
economy had been replaced by a specific historical model (monetary economy) became the main 
argument put forward in Polanyi’s Great Transformation (printed in 1944, but written, according to 
his unpublished papers, during the early 1930s: see Becchio 1997).  
From a political point of view, Polanyi and Neurath brought the same critique against the political 
approach of Austrian school (in particular against Hayek’s ideas set out in Road To Serfdom 
(1944)), although they both used the same analytical tools in economics as Austrian school of 
economics : they accepted the marginalist theory in its Austrian version, rejecting for example the 
labour-theory, and they were both influenced by Carl Menger (see Neurath [1929], 1973 and 
Polanyi 1971; 1977).
14  
They both endorsed the importance of individualism, albeit with some differences. For Neurath, 
economics was founded on the postulate of maximization of the individual’s utility; nevertheless, 
economic theory could not be regarded as a isolated discipline because it was a part – together with 
history – of sociology. For Polanyi, individualism should be reformulated in a new sense after the 
failure of the self-regulating market. Polanyi sought to explain what he called the ‘moral dilemma’ 
of economic liberalism: “can the individual be sacrificed to the self-regulating system? or should it 
be reformulated? By who and according to which principles?”
15. Polanyi claimed that the market in 
liberal society denied the true nature of mankind; on the contrary, Mises ad Hayek maintained that 
it exalted that true nature. According to Polanyi, a new individualism could arise if socialism was 
based not on a collectivist vision but a Christian one that guaranteed political democracy and 
economic equality. According to Neurath, a new society and a new individualism could arise by 
virtue of a new Weltaufassung, or a new scientific conception of the world, which freed individuals 
and society from metaphysics. In a society of this kind, individuals would be free because they 
could control their real conditions of life (on Polanyi’s view) or their qualities of life (on Neurath’s 
view). By contrast, Hayek maintained that the liberal system guarantees freedom by means of the 
mechanism of competition in a representative democratic system. In his Planning or Managerial 
Revolution?, Neurath agreed with Hayek that there are people who envisage planning as a new 
means to obtain totalitarian leadership, while there are others who unwittingly support fascism by 
promoting certain principles pf planning. But he did not accept Hayek’s contention that all kinds of 
planning belonged to this category: “Hayek seems to exaggerate his case by giving only one choice 
between what he calls the freedom of market competition and the planner’s unlimited a 
totalitarianism. He never think of planning as a co-operative effort, based on compromise. 
Moreover, in fighting totalitarianism he thinks it is one’s duty to fight planning as well, and to 
                                                 
14 According to Leonard (1998 p. 9), Neurath regarded marginal utility as “metaphysical concept … 
central to the bourgeois Austrian economic theory of Menger’s father”.  
15 Karl Polanyi The Moral Values underlying social organization in the political, economic and cultural 
field,Bennington College, 1941-42, Karl Polanyi Institute of Political Economy, Concordia University, 
Montreal.   18
support market competition” (ibid p. 546), and he finally maintained that: “world planning based on 
co-operation would perhaps give rise to a world-wide feeling of responsibility for other people’s 
happiness” (ibid p. 547).  
Concerning the rise of fascism, it is worth recalling Neurath’s review of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom 
(Neurath 2004 p. 546-8), in which he criticized Hayek’s idea that a planned economy was 
totalitarian from a political point of view and unscientific from a theoretical one. He rejected these 
dichotomies and pointed out that Hayek had forgotten that planning is possible within a democracy, 
and that conceiving just one form of society as the best is a form of ‘pseudo-rationalism’. The 
conclusion of Neurath’s Planning for Freedom (1945) was the same as Polanyi’s Great 
Transformation: democracy and socialism could be united in a form of society, and doing so was 
the challenge for the future of Western civilization. They shared the same utopian view that the 
passage to a new socialistic society was inevitable from an historical point of view, and that it 
would free society from the faults of liberalism. They shared the ideal of finding a third way 
between capitalism (private ownership of the means of production, free rules for its management, 
with the inevitable exploitation of the working class, as had happened after the industrial 
revolutions), and soviet communism (collective ownership of the means of production, central 
management and planned control of individual incomes by the canalization of consume and 
savings). According to Polanyi and Neurath, in fact, capitalism and communism were both founded 
on the primacy of the economy (from an individualist or collectivist point of view) over the rest of 
society. The third way proposed by Polanyi and Neurath was based on the idea of ‘community’, as 
opposed to ‘society’, organized thus: collective ownership of the means of production, free 
management, and freedom of individual economic choices. The model was utopian in many 
respects. From an economic point of view, how can it be technically feasible to plan production 
without any control over distribution – is it possible to create waste or shortage if overall demand is 
too low or too high? From a sociological point of view, why should managers behave any 
differently from those in a capitalist system? From a philosophical point of view, we cannot rule out 
that the concept of community may not be the base for the onset of totalitarianism, where is the 
freedom for those who do not accept the mechanism of communitarian rules? Finally, from a 
political point of view, to what extent could such a system really guarantee freedom in a complex 
society? This was the final question of The Great Transformation: “is it possible a freedom in a 
complex society”? According to Polanyi, it is necessary to change the concept of freedom: the 
challenge of the future would be not only reinstating some sort of embedded economy – which 
fascism had sought to do with corporativism – but above all realizing democracy in the economic 
field as well. Polanyi probably still had in mind the functionalistic economy that, twenty years 
earlier, he had conceived as an alternative to liberalism and collectivism.  Neurath’s idea of 
international planning “as a measure against unhappiness” (Neurath 2004, p. 544) would probably 
have been his answer to Polanyi’s question.   19
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